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Abstract: In the Environmental Protection Agency's proposed mitigation measures (published
1/17/07, Federal Register), we can see the precautionary principle in action: "When an activity
raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically"
(Ashford 1998). EPA's proposed measures would classify all second-generation anticoagulant
rodenticides as "restricted use ," so that they cannot be sold to the general public. This proposed
restriction will diminish the ability of consumers to control rodents in their own residence, and
will disproportionately affect minority and low-income citizens in the large cities of America.
EPA's analysis fails to properly account for the potential impact on public health and other social
costs of their mitigation proposal. The EPA 's analysis does not show that second-generation
anticoagulant rodenticides present a significant hazard to non-target wildlife. At best , it simply
makes a case that primary and secondary hazards are possible. It does not allow any conclusions
about the actual risk posed to wildlife. Liphatech (and other manufacturers , through the
Rodenticide Registrants ' Task Force , RRTF) have proposed alternative mitigation measure s to
address both risks to wildlife and risks to children, while preserving the public's access to the
most effective rodent control pesticides. The proposed alternatives include : limiting consumer
rodenticide use to inside of buildings , using bittering agents in consumer products , directing
consumers to use smaller bait placements , using label language that is more clear and
understandable to the consumer , providing consumer education through internet sites and pointof-sale signs /brochures
Key words: bait station, human safety, precautionary principle , risk mitigation , rodent control,
rodent damage, rodenticide , rodenticide restriction, secondary hazard
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Proceeding s of the 12' Wildlife Damage
Management Conference (D.L. Nolte, W .M.
Arjo , D.H. Stalman, Eds). 2007

INTRODUCTION
Liphatech Inc ., is a manufacturer of
rodenticide products , utilizing three active
ingredients
that were discovered
and
commercialized
by
a
pharmaceutical
manufacturer based in Lyon , France. We are
also a member
of the Rodenticide
Registrants' Task Force (RRTF), and have
been closely following the reregistration and
ecological risk assessment processes for
rodenticides. The views expressed in this
paper represent only Liphatech. RRTF
members have achieved consensus on many

issues , but my remarks may not reflect the
opinions or positions of all rodenticide
manufacturers or RR TF members.
While others have addressed risks to
wildlife, I would like to focus on the most
important non-target species in this country
that should most concerns us: human beings!
Liphatech would like to speak out on behalf
of the "retail consumers " in America. The
U.S. Environmental
Protection
Agency
(EPA) estimates that homeowners spend
more than $90 million per year on rodent
control , with 90% of that amount spent on

bait. lt is critical that our discussions about
the non-target hazards of rodenticide take
account for the risk to people : "So me
rodents can be injurious to humans and their
belongings.
Both introduced and native
species may be carriers or reservoirs for
infectious diseases . Rodents may cause
economic damage to crops; consume and
contaminate stored food supplies; disturb
soil through burrowing activities; damage
houses, other types of buildings and manmade structures; and prey on native species,
including birds that nest on oceanic islands .
It is generally estimated that commensal rats
cause between $0.5 and $1.0 billion of
economic
losses in the United States
annually" (Edwards 2007).
Under the mitigation
measures
proposed by EPA on January 17, 2007,
homeowners would no longer have access to
baits
contammg
second
generation
anticoagulant roderiticides (SGARs). The
proposal also includes a requirement that all
rodenticide for sale to a consumer must be
sold in a tamper-resistant bait statio n, with
solid bait blocks as the only permissible bait ,
in order to reduce the number of children
exposed to these product s.
The EPA's analysis "Po ten tial Risks
of Nine Rodenticides to Birds and Nontarget Mammals: a Comparative Approach"
(Erickson and Urban 2004) does not show
that
second-ge neration
anticoagu Iant
rodenticides present a significant hazard to
non-target wildlife. This comparative risk
assessment does not fully assess "ris k"
because it does not assess the ·'exposure"
component of the risk equation (i.e., risk =
toxicity X exposure) as is necessary if one is
to fully assess risk. The assessment and
"peer review" were not conducted in
accordance with EPA's own guidelines. The
document clearly states that the analysis is
severely limited , discussing the uncertainties
at length , and showing an extensive list of
the "data needs " necessary for the analysis

to be made meaningful. There has been no
data call-in to gather the necessary
information.
There were many public
comments concerning the poor science and
other major deficiencies
of this risk
assessment, and we note that EPA has failed
to respond to most of these criticisms. At
best, this analysis simply makes a case that
primary and secondary hazards are possible.
Yet, we see EPA acting as if there were no
questions or uncertainty surrounding this
analysis:
"EPA's comparative ecological
risk assessment concludes that all nine
rodenticide
active
ingredients
pose
significant risks to non-target wildlife when
applied as grain-based bait products."
(Edwards 2007)
More important for this discussion,
EPA's
analysis
does not include a
meaningful assessment of public health
impact and benefits of rodenticide use . How
will
the proposed
restnct10ns
affect
consumers who are trying to control rodents
in their homes? What do the public health
experts of the U.S. governme nt have to say
about this proposal? There is nothing
substa ntial in the docket from the Centers
for Di sease
Control,
Department
of
Agriculture,
or Housing
and Urban
Dev e lopment , despite the sta tement that
EPA
will
"co ntinue
its
ongoing
consultations ... " with these agencies. Where
can we find the needed analy sis of the
soc ietal benefits of rodenticide use?
Perhaps we can find our answers in
the Agency's
" [mpact Assessment for
Proposed Rodenticide Mitigation" (Edwards
2007). This document emphasizes risks to
children from exposure to rodenticide,
showing that there were more than l 7,000
reported "rodenticide exposure incidents"
per year (3-year average for 2003-2005),
and the reported cases may only account for
a quarter of all actual exposures. Where the
outcome of the reported exposure is known,
93% are reported as "no effect," although

(Chiri et al. 2006). "EPA further believes
that replacement
of second-generation
anticoagulants
with
first
generation
anticoagulants will not significantly affect
the homeowners
capability
to control
rodents ... " (Edwards 2007). Are we sure
about this? On this very same page , EPA
states that second-generation rodenticides
are
superior
in
controlling
rodent
populations: "For those residential settings
where
second-generation
anticoagulants
provide a distinct advantage, these products
would still be available from certified
applicators" (Edwards 2007). EPA clearly
recognizes that the older , first generation
rodenticides will likely not be as effective:
"Multiple
dose
(first
generation)
anticoagulant baits are especially vulnerable
to situations where the availability of
alternative food sources make it less likely
that a rodent will return to feed on baits for
several days in succession until it ingests a
lethal dose" (Chiri et al. 2006).
Certainly , the older, first-generation
rodcnticides can be made to pass EPA' s
laboratory efficacy tests , but are they equal
to the SGARs in controlling
rodent
populations?
Trade name ( or brand)
awareness and loyalty are a result of the
product 's perceived value to the consumer.
lf the consumers do not get the expected
value (if the product does not work as
expected) then the trade name will not draw
the consumers' interest. The brand names
that are recognized and attractive to
consumers have established a history and
reputation for their effectiveness . If the
popular brand does not work very we ll, it
will not be popular very long! Consumers
are, in fact, selecting the active ingredient.
When they select products with a history
and reputation for good performance , they
select the active ingredient that provides this
performance.
Should
these
important
risk
mitigation decisions be based on broad,

some costs are incurred from health facility
visits and: "In addition, there are likely to
be costs associated with lost productivity for
the time and anxiety associated with a call to
a poison control center" (Chiri et al. 2006).
The impact assessment mentions various
figures about rat-bite incidents , including a
1969 estimate of 14,000 bite incidents per
year to the 140 million city dwellers in the
U.S . Notably, the document fails to assign
any cost, time lost or anxiety associated with
this large number of rat bite incidents .
The assessment also purports to
make an estimation of some of the costs to
users associated
with the mitigations ,
including
a
"soc io-economic
equity
assessment." It discusses "severa l economic
methods that can be used to place a value on
ecosystem
services."
It mentions the
potential for market distortions and the large
uncertainty associated with estimating the
costs of the proposed actions.
In the end, however , this impact
assessment was unable to "monetize" the
potential costs, the health effects or
environmental benefits associated with the
proposed mitigation actions. There is no
explanation of how the cost versus benefit is
weighed. Instead , we are left with only the
general conclusions
that the proposed
mitigation should not have an adverse
impact on residential users in terms of
significantly increased costs or decreased
effectiveness.
These
conclusions
are
founded on some dubious assumptions,
including these: "One snap ( or glue) trap is
assumed to be , roughly , the equivalent of
one bait station with bait blocks " (Chiri et
al. 2006). "Low income consumers living in
apartment buildings most likely rely on the
building owner or manager for rodent
contro l inside the apartment or building"
(Chiri et al. 2006). "EPA assumes that
consumers' selection of rodenticide baits is
primarily driven by trade nam es and not by
the active ingredi ents contained in the baits"

136

untested assumptions? ls it prudent to
examine how the proposal could affect
humans and non-target wildlife if these
critical assumptions do not hold true? Do we
really believe that there will be no impact
when the highly effective SGAR products
are taken away from consumers? Let us
consider: "S ince a wide range of rodent
control options would continue to be
available,
no adverse impact on the
frequency of rat bites is expected as a result
of the proposed mitigation " (Chiri et al.
2006) . The 1969 estimate of 14,000 bite
incidents per year was based on an estimate
of 140 million city dwellers . The 1970 U.S.
population of 213 million has now grown to
more than 300 million , an increase of more
than 40%. The population of city dwellers
may have increased by an even greater
percentage, but let us assume that urban
population growth has been the same as the
general population. That gives us an
estimate of about 197 mi Ilion urban dwellers
today . Has the rate of rat bites remained at
the same rate? If so, there would be almost
20 ,000 rat bites per year in the U.S. How
many of these rat-bite incidents would be
considered
"no effect,"
compared
to
rodenticide "expos ure incidents" where 93%
are classified as "no effect?" If the proposed
restrictions do , in fact , make rodent control
more difficult and less effective, will the
number of rat bites increase? What is the
soc ial and medical cost associated with bite
incident s, compared to the rodenticide
exposure
incidents? Are the proposed
restriction s truly "protecting children" from
the real hazards posed by rodents?
EPA ' s cost analysis shows the
consumer ' s "cos t" could decrease by using
traps rather than rodenticide.
The cost is
estimated to increase by 83% up to 976% if
the consumer chooses to continue using bait ,
which must be pre-packaged in a bait station
under the proposed requirements. Due to the
very stringent requirements for a "tamper

resistant " bait station , actual costs are likely
to be even higher. Cost to the consumer
increases by at least 10,000 % if the services
of a professional pest control operator are
necessary. What would be the real cost of
the proposed restrictions?
Perhaps
we can consider
the
alternatives more carefully for the answers.
Snap traps and glue traps have always been
the
lowest-cost
control
method , but
consumers have still chosen to spend 90% of
their money on bait products. This suggests
that consumers have determined that baits
are more effective in controlling rodent
infestations, in spite of EPA' s assumptions
to the contrary. If consumers continue to
choose rodenticide
baits as the most
effective control method available to them ,
then the EPA ' s analysis shows that their
costs will rise dramatically. Using EPA's
own numbers , the $90 million currently
spent on baits could rise to $175 million
(95% increase) or even up to $878 million
(976%). At what point will increased costs
become significa nt? How docs EPA make a
cost /benefit analysis to support the sta ted
conclusion: "E PA has concluded that the
expected reduction in children ' s exposure to
rodenticide bait products outweighs the
estimated
cost mcrea se due to the
requirement
for
tamper-resistant
bait
stations" (Edwards 2007).
How have we arrived at such a
situation , where such important public
health decisions are based on such flimsy
analyses?
It appears that we see the
precautionary principle in action: "When an
activity raises threats of harm to human
health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some
cause and effect relationships are not fully
established scientifically" (Ashford 1998).
Is there a better way to address the
concerns that have been identified? Since
the first stakeho lder meetings were held in
1999 and 2000, the RR TF has promoted
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sensible m1t1gation measures that could be
implemented quickly and with little cost to
the consumer. These mitigation would offer
increased protection to wildlife and children,
while still allowing the public's access to the
most effective rodent baits available : using
label language
that 1s more
clear,
understandable
and informative to the
consumer; providing consumer education
through internet sites and point-of-sale
signs /brochures ; directing consumers to use
smaller bait placements ; limiting consumer
rodenticide
application
to inside
of
buildings; and inclusion of bittering agents
in consumer products.
Several times , the RR TF group ha s
attempted to prod EPA into adopting the
label improvement measure s, but each time
EPA failed to move forward. EPA has
generally
considered
product
label
improvements to be the first tool for
promoting product stewardship . ln the past
20 years , EPA has developed many label
improvement programs , including a large
effort called the " Consumer Labeling
Initiative ." Thus , it is particularly surprising
that
EPA
has
not
initiated
label
improvements for rodenticides before taking
more drastic actions: "Independent of the
mitigation measures discussed above , EPA
is cu1Tently considering specific labeling
improvements to make rodenticide labels
clearer and more understandable .
ln
particular , the Agency is focused on labeling
changes that would provide clearer direction
to consumers on how to use rodenticide
products in order to minimize potential
exposure to children , wildlife , and pets. The
Agency has concluded , however , that
labeling enhancements alone would not

mitigate the risks to children and wildlife to
a sufficient degree ." (Edwards 2007)
How has EPA reached this important
conclusion about the insufficiency of label
improvements? What specific improvements
could be made , and how would their effect
be measured? The product is the best means
of communicating important information to
the user of a pesticide product. Why would
label improvements be delayed , rather than
used as the first stewardship effort?
All of the reasonable mitigation
proposed by RRTF can help to reduce the
exposure of children and non-target wildlife
to rodenticides . These low-cost measures
should be implemented
and properly
evaluated before EPA denies consumer
acces s to these effective rodent control
products .
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